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1Directors’ Remuneration: The Need For a Geo-Political Perspective
There are many ways to construct an incentive program. However, most compensation
plans tend to be focused on profitability and profitability-related accomplishments with
little or no incentive for corporate social responsibility. Director’s compensation
continues to climb with the United States leading and Britain following modestly behind.
The question as to where fair pay ends and over-compensation begins - and what that
means for the community - is rarely raised. In order to understand the impact of fair and
over-compensated director’s pay on other stakeholders, a geo-political perspective is
proposed that builds on knowledge of existing theories of the firm.1
Key words: Directors’ remuneration, geo-politics of executive pay, executive pay
structures, executives’ pay models, executive pay incentives.
Introduction
The debate on toil, what it is and what it is worth pre-occupies scholars and practitioners alike. The
historian, Thomas Carlyle, argued that ‘all true work is sacred’ (Carlyle, 1999: 206). In contrast, his
contemporary philosopher, John Stuart Mill, held that work ‘is not good in itself as there is nothing
laudable in work for work’s sake’ (Mill, 1998). The benefit to be gained from work is that of
compensation and it is this latter view that has captured the limelight. The last two decades have been
dominated by the corporate mantra of ‘shareholder value’ and rising remuneration packages for
executives (Frederick, 1986). At the same time, the remuneration of directors is one of the most intensely
researched and, perhaps, least understood areas of management. The director’s remuneration
phenomenon attracts concern and emotion from shareholders, employers, politicians, the press and global
stakeholders. Although a number of longitudinal studies (O’Reilly et al, 1988; Main et al, 1995; Buck et
al, 2001) and empirical surveys (Abowd and Kaplan, 1999; Camp, 1989) have attempted to explain the
interaction between remuneration structure and company performance, very little has been done to
explain the remunerator’s magnitude, structure and sensitivity to the long-term impact on stakeholders
and wider community (Bowen, 1953). The scholarly debate primarily focuses on the company director’s
remuneration incentives with only an occasional mention in the popular press of the growing divide
between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’. Particularly, the debate over executive directors’ remuneration
has focused on three aspects of the remuneration package, namely:
1 This manuscript has greatly benefited from the review comments made by Ruth Bender, Cranfield
School of Management and the journal’s anonymous reviewers.
2 the magnitude of basic remuneration and reward increases;
 the structure of remuneration, with a focus on the large gains from share
options and the compensation payments to directors on loss of office; and
 the sensitivity of the remuneration incentive to share price performance.
This paper provides an overview of the current debate and theories that attempt to explain directors’
remuneration. Attention is given to Agency, Economic and Socio-Comparative approaches and
underlying theories (Coase, 1960). It is concluded that although a number of theoretical perspectives
provide some explanation of the phenomena, none truly explain it (Ackerman and Bauer, 1976). It is
argued that a geo-political perspective is required, namely one that takes into account the impact on
community needs in determining these factors (Chamberlain, 1973; Carroll, 1979). A geo-political model
is presented, concluding that broader inter-disciplinary research is needed in finding solutions to the
complex issue of directors’ remuneration integral to corporate governance and the global community
(Coase, 1937).
The Agency Approach
Since its conception, Berle and Means’ (1932) Principal-Agent model underpins the philosophy of
the modern theory of the firm and many models of corporate governance, including that of executive
compensation (Ratneser, 2000). Providing incentives to managers of publicly-owned companies is the
classic example of the Principal-Agent challenge that assumes that the primary means for shareholders to
ensure that managers take optimal actions is to tie managers’ pay to the performance of their firm; in
effect to provide incentives for managers to maximise returns to shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932).
Pursuing such a linkage is considered to align the interests of managers with the interests of shareholders.
Considering that executives take non-transparent and unobserved actions that affect returns to
shareholders, Principal-Agent Theory suggests that executive compensation needs to be correlated with
the total return to shareholders, typically through ownership of the firm’s stock or options on the firm’s
stock. However, despite the compelling logic of the Principal-Agent framework, there is little existing
3empirical support for the effectiveness of the Principal-Agent model when applied to executive
compensation. Using pay-performance sensitivity measures, a number of empirical studies are unable to
support the executive reward/corporate performance linkages underlying the Principal-Agent model
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Janakiraman et al, 1992; Garen, 1994; Haubrich, 1994; Aggarwal and
Samwick, 1999). In general, these studies found that the pay-performance sensitivity for executives at
firms with the least volatile stock prices is an order of magnitude greater than pay-performance
sensitivity for executives at firms with the most volatile stock prices (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999).
Overall, a number of empirical studies (Barro and Barro, 1990; Janakiraman et al, 1992) have found that
compensation increases according to industry performance. However, the agency perspective holds that
the remuneration contract should be used to align the interests of the director with those of the
shareholder and such thinking has underpinned many regulatory committees in this area (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). For example in the UK, the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998)
Committees have taken this perspective.
Overall, agency theory predicts that the separation of owners and managers potentially leads to
managers of firms taking actions, which do not maximise shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Such action may include excessive salaries for directors not tied to performance or them
undertaking value-destroying mergers. The agency framework suggests that internal monitoring
mechanisms will help to ensure that directors implement policies consistent with the maximisation of
shareholders’ wealth. These include non-executive director representation to monitor board decisions,
separation of the chairman and chief executive posts and the establishment of board sub-committees.
The Economic/Market Approach
The dominant model of the firm continues to be of Neo-Classical Theory derived from Adam Smith’s
(1937) idea of the relationship between producers/owners and consumers, where the under-pinning
theme is market forces and rationality (Friedman, 1962). Thus, economic values guide choice and
choices are rational and utility maximising. In Neo-Classical economic theory, the goal of Smith’s (1937)
Economic Man is to maximise the wealth of the firm and is based on contractual duties owed to owners
(Brenner and Cochran, 1991). The main assumption is that the only duties the firm has to external others
4are financial and these duties are owed to the owners which, in the case of modern corporations, are
shareholders (Brenner and Cochran, 1991).
Moreover, in order to resolve agency tensions, external control mechanisms such as market
competition and internal control mechanisms such as corporate governance, are mostly utilised. In order
to enhance internal controls, improvement of corporate governance has been interpreted as increasing the
number of external directors with them being attentive to corporate direction and control; exemplified by
pension fund activism (Branceto, 1997). Market mechanisms are left to supply and demand for goods
and services and price competition for the delivery of goods. The economic approach uses a subset of
Contract Theory and Agency Theory to explain and predict firm behaviour; notably that managers act as
agents for stockholders/principals.
However, the market/economic perspective is increasingly being criticised. One view is that markets
are social constructs that need support to survive and prosper. Top executives do not generate wealth by
themselves; they do so against a backdrop of social institutions and human capital. Is it then fair and
legitimate that the market should set the terms on which the few can accumulate wealth? (Prowse, 2000).
An additional perspective is that globalisation and information technology (IT) have increased the
importance of worldwide factors in steering share prices, often at the expense of local country factors. On
this basis, individual stock markets are increasingly being driven by global, rather than local, factors
(Brooks and Catao, 2000). The increased mobility of capital, combined with more efficient trading
systems, under-pinned by the advance of IT, has increased cross-border trading of shares, creating
something closer to a global equity market (Brooks and Catao, 2000). With the proliferation of Internet-
based technology, it has become both increasingly easier for investors to acquire information on foreign
firms and for large corporations to be listed on more than one market. In addition, the wave of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions results in overseas profits accounting for a larger slice of company
performance. The fact that an enterprise belongs to a particular industry, be it pharmaceuticals or utilities,
has become more important in explaining variations in returns on investment, over time, than the
enterprises’ home country market (Brooks and Catao, 2000). The question raised is, how can current
levels of executive pay be justified when the transformational element of a CEO’s role is minimised and
the transactional component accentuated? (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 1999).
5The Social Comparison Approach
The social comparison perspective explains firm behaviour by integrating observed social
performance with observed economic performance (Sethi, 1975; 1979). In addition, the comparison
perspective builds on Socio-Physiological and Legitimacy Theory, emphasising, for example, role
expectations and role behaviours (Katz and Kahn, 1978; Biddle, 1986) and roles as determinants of
social position and organisational status (Biddle, 1979; 1986). Moreover, the concept of role sets
(Merton, 1957) and concepts of organisational sets (Evan, 1966) are identified as the underpinnings of
Stakeholder Theory (Freeman, 1984). The social comparison perspective holds that the magnitude and
structure of executive remuneration can be determined by comparisons of observable performance of
directors across industries (Heald, 1970; Jones, 1995). It assumes that the members of an organisation’s
remuneration committee, composed of non-executive directors, form opinion and approve the magnitude
of directors’ remuneration by making comparisons with their own executive roles and remuneration in
their home organisation (Bender and Porter, 2001a; 2001b; 2001c). Ironically, such personalised views of
executive remuneration are being favourably received as over-relying on surveys of executive
compensation encouraging a type of ‘group-think’ such as everyone is doing it, so should we (Power,
1991).
Moreover, directors who are at the receiving end of remuneration also make comparison with the
remuneration of other directors in similar situations to themselves, invoking role expectations and equity
perceptors which enable them to make a choice to stay with the enterprise or to seek alternatives
(Merton, 1957; Evan, 1966). These two sets of external peer comparison act as an anchor in determining
an appropriate level of pay (Hosseini and Brenner, 1992). Similarly, the social comparison perspective
suggests that the structure of pay will be based on structures successfully adopted by other companies,
finding support in Institutional Theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) in order to legitimise the actions of
the home community, as suggested by Legitimacy Theory (Davis, 1973).
6Overview of Director’s Pay
Considering that executive directors do not realise their vision of ever improving share performance
in the market place alone but depend on internal stakeholders, such as employees and suppliers, and on
the external stakeholders, such as legal and financial institutions and governments in the economies of
their operations, it is illuminating to compare directors’ pay with those of Heads of State (Table 1). The
question of what is ‘fair’ reward is a long debated one. Plato (1991) reasoned that the ‘right ratio’
between the top and bottom is 5:1. Peter Drucker postulated that is should be 20:1 (Wagner, 1999). The
norm in Continental Europe and Japan is a multiple of 18 and 15 (Table 4), whilst in Cyprus and China
the ratio is 3:1, respectively (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001). In the USA, the gap between executive
pay and average pay is continuously increasing. The CEO of AT&T earns 400 times what the lowest-
paid employee earns (Wagner and Minard, 1999).
Table 1: Basic Pay For CEOs in Medium -Sized
Enterprises and Head of States (in USA Dollars)
2001 Basic Annual Pay
(excluding add-ons)
USA UK Japan Germany Sweden France
Estimated average for
CEOs in medium-sized
enterprises (2001)
530,000 305,000 310,000 210,000 190,000 240,000
Government Head of
State (2001)
400,000 225,000 195,000 150,000 105,000 100,000
Source: Compiled from Towers Perrin (2002); Japan Information Centre (2002); and
Time (2001)
One reason for such disparities in the USA is that since 1994 there has been a large increase in the
use of stock options and other incentives to provide for CEO compensation and incentives (Table 2). In
addition to being an important component of CEO compensation, stock options are also a critical
consideration towards CEO equity incentives. Research shows that the options balance in CEO annual
pay varies across industry groupings, whereby in ‘new economy’ firms (e-high-technology) equity based
compensation substantially exceeds that provided in the longer ‘old economy’, manufacturing and utility
firms (Ittner et al, 2001).
7Table 2: Remuneration Magnitude and Structure of CEO’s Estimated Average Package in
Medium-Sized Enterprises (in USA Dollars)
Estimated Average
CEO’s Pay (2001)
USA UK Japan Germany Sweden France
Basic Pay 530,000 305,000 310,000 210,000 190,000 240,000
Plus add-ons: 1,403.000 364,00 198,000 245,000 224,000 279,000
 Variable bonus Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Compulsory
company
contribution
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Voluntary
company
contribution
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes*
 Pre-requisites Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Long-term
incentives
Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Total Pay 1,933,000 669,000 508,000 455,000 414,000 519,000
*A new add-on introduced in 2001, which was not previously used.
Source: Compiled from Pic (2001); Towers Perrin (2002)
Similar to the USA, senior executive remuneration in the UK has increased dramatically and more so
than their counterparts in medium sized enterprises (Table 2). In 1999, top British executives were paid
an average of US$1,004,000 (£717,000) in which was included a long-term incentive scheme (Prowse,
2000). The impetus for a shift in the structure of directors’ pay, in the UK, occurred in 1995 with the
publication of the Greenbury Report (1995), which recommended principles for director remuneration in
relation to accountability, transparency and linkage to performance. Until 1995, Unconditional Executive
Director’s Share Option schemes (ESOs) were prevalent (Conyon and Murphy, 2000), allowing
executives to purchase company shares in the future at current prices thus giving them every incentive to
raise share price.
The initial ESO structure was scoped in the 1980s in the USA and diffused across UK companies. As
a result of bull markets and regardless of the quality of their decisions, many executives reaped large
gains although they chose to invest their resources in shares and in transactions openly available to all
8investors at the time of the options award (Economist, 2001; Time, 1999). This gradually attracted media
criticism, leading to tighter regulation by government and self-regulation by the Stock Exchange,
accountancy professions and institutional investors (Blundell and Robinson, 2000). In turn, more open
disclosure of detailed operations of adopted remuneration instruments ensued. Greenbury (1995)
recommended that companies replace ESOs with more challenging performance criteria, conditional
share options (CESOs) and/or long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The LTIP is effectively a CESO, with
a zero exercise price, thus, making no demands on the executive’s own finances. Both CESOs and LTIPs
can be seen as different forms of remuneration share-based schemes and are often valued using one of
three available valuation models, namely, the value of options issued during a given accounting year, or
the cost of all options as if they were ‘immunised’ by the company thus holding identical value in the
market, or ‘full cost’ covering the change in the value of all outstanding options plus the cost of the
exercised options during the year (McKnight and Tomkins, 1999).
By the end of 2000, in the UK, the average FTSE 100 CEO earned £1.7 million (Patterson and
Jauhal, 2001). The payouts of £14 million one-off share bonuses to Chris Gent at Vodafone AirTouxh,
initially announced as the reward for successful acquisition, provoked not only media attention in the UK
in 2000 but also concern amongst institutional shareholders (Kennedy, 2000). In addition, the structure of
Gent’s remuneration incentive consisted of seven schemes without clarity or guidelines about the
circumstances under which these incentives would be paid (Myners, 2001).
Considering that Gent had spent almost £200 billion on the Mannesmann acquisition – the equivalent
of about a quarter of the UK’s GDP in the space of two years, and in the light of last year’s fall of share
price from a high of 399 pence to less then 150 pence, it means that Gent spent £200 billion to create a
business worth £100 billion – an extreme case of value destruction (The Week, 2001). Moreover, in 2001
Vodafone’s award of £8.0 million share options – potentially worth nearly £13 million to Gent over the
next five years, provoked discontent amongst stakeholders (The Week, 2001). Similar concerns were
expressed about the £2.8 million payment to Bob Ayling for quitting as CEO of British Airways in the
wake of slump in profits (Kennedy, 2000). Further, the pay of executives in the utilities sector rose 106%
compared with total shareholder return (TSR) for the year of 30% (Patterson and Jauhal, 2001). Ayling
and Gent are not exceptional cases as it has become more commonplace for director reward to outstrip
9company performance in terms of shareholder return (Table 3). In the UK, it is increasingly being held
that rewarding executives with shares rather than options is fairer, a view that is increasingly becoming
popular in the USA (Patterson and Jauhal, 2001).
Table 3: Rewards Versus Performance of FTSE 100 in 2000
Total Shareholders
Return
Above 40% 20%-40% 0%-20% Below 0%
Director’s Wealth
Increase
121% 69% 23% -20%
Source: Compiled from Patterson and Jauhal (2001)
A strong emergent opinion is that driven by shareholder interests, executive management is focused
on short-term objectives in creating, or at least maintaining, high share prices at the expense of other
stakeholders, particularly internal stakeholders (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001). As a result, a serious
division is emerging in society between those few rich and the vast majority on ‘average’ pay. Executive
pay in the USA considerably adds to such division than that of their counterparts in Europe and Japan
(Table 4). The difference is considerable even in small and medium-sized companies and in the large
corporations, considerably higher. In 1997, the top executive’s average remuneration in the USA was
325 times the average pay of the shop floor worker. In 2000, it was 523 times as great, whilst in 2002 it
was 600:1 (Kochan, 2002). The average remuneration of a UK chief executive was 18 times more than
the average worker and 20:1 in 2002 (Taylor, 1999; Institute of Policy Studies, 2002). The ratio of 20:1
is the highest ratio in the European Union, whilst the average pay of French chief executives is 12 times
that of the average operative (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001).
Table 4: Pay Ratio of CEO and Workers
Year USA UK Japan Germany Sweden France
1997 325:1 18:1 15:1 13:1 11:1 12:1
2002 600:1 20: 1 15: 1 14: 1 11:1 12:1
Source: Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2001); Institute of Policy Studies (2002);
Japan Information Centre (2002)
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According to the Report by the Institute of Policy Studies and United For a Fair Economy (2001), the
average pay of the CEOs of 365 major corporations in 2001 was US$13.1 million, which is a 571%
increase on the early 1990s. However, the average factory worker’s annual pay was US$24,668, which
in 2001, if it had grown at the same rate as CEO pay, would be more than US$120,000. In the same vein,
if the minimum wage of US$3.80 in 1990 had grown at the same rate as CEO pay, (571%) it would, in
2001, be US$25.50 an hour, rather than US$5.15 an hour (IPS/UFFE, 2003).
As the gap in the USA between executive pay and average operative pay continuously increases, the
escalated pay of star CEO ‘performers’ also propagates disparities in pay for second- and third-tier
executives. In the UK, the traditional limit of 50% difference between CEO remuneration and his/her
direct associates has long gone. The gap is widening (Myners, 2001). Research conducted by the
actuarial firm William Mercer, found that the average value of share options awarded to senior
executives in blue-chip companies had doubled over the previous year (Kennedy, 2000).
Whether such a state of affairs will continue has been thrown into doubt as in January 2003 the UK’s
FTSE 100 Index fell by 143.4 points wiping out £700 billion from the value of stocks and representing a
drop of 50.2% from the share value peak of 1999 (Paterson et al, 2003). With such decline in value,
activist shareholders are increasingly not accepting ‘fat cat’ pay packages. Most notable has been the
rejection of the remuneration policy of GlaxoSmithKline, in particular, the package of its CEO, Jean-
Pierre Garnier (Foley, 2003). Predictions are being made that shareholders will, from now, actively
target director’s pay, with HSBC, ICI and Tesco reported as the next to undergo scrutiny over ‘payment
for failure’ in boardrooms (Griffiths and Wough, 2003). In fact, the ‘first shot across HSBC’s bows’ has
already been fired with the public display of shareholder unease concerning HSBC’s new board member,
William F. Aldinger III’s three year, US$37.5 million package (Gibson, 2003). Although John Bond,
HSBC’s chairman, successfully defended Aldringer, such resentment is being directed towards
legislators, where, in particular, Patricia Hewitt, the UK’s Trade and Industry Secretary, is currently
preparing a paper on approaches to curbing excessive boardroom remuneration awards (Borrus and
Arndt, 2003).
11
Overall, the investor initiative to curb senior executive pay is gaining momentum (Borrus and Arndt,
2003). Union and public pension funds are capitalising on investor irritation concerning inflated
remuneration and bankruptcy-proof retirement executive packages, particularly in poor performing
companies. Proxy based resolutions have made an impact on a number of large corporations, Delta, Bank
of America, Norfolk Southern Corp, in terms of curbing excessive stock options and ‘golden parachute’
severance packages (Borrus and Arndt, 2003). Although shareholder resolutions are not binding on
management, the new willingness by mutual funds and other institutional investors to vote against
management is increasingly persuasive in requiring shareholder approval of CEOs pay and severance
packages (Covlin, 2003).
Executive Incentives
Despite the USA Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, echoing continental European
counterparts in warning against stock-option excesses, the performance-based executive composition
package inclusive of incentive pay and stock options, has remained (Amihud and Lev, 1999). Further to
the inequities and the ensuing political repercussions, an additional reason for caution is the enhanced
propensity to take risk, thus counteracting the ‘natural’ managerial tendency toward risk reduction
(Amihud and Lev, 1999). The executive incentive for risk taking leads to increased mergers and
acquisitions and above normal market earnings to shareholders which, in-turn, promote increased
individual earnings to executives with the danger of giving minimal attention to sustainable growth
(Amihud and Lev, 1999). The assumption that the reduction of agency costs through the separation of
ownership and control can be mediated by the involvement of institutional investors and board
composition, is being increasingly challenged (Amihud and Lev, 1999). Ever higher executive pay is not
necessarily the best way for reducing agency costs and, additionally, falls short of considering other
stakeholders. Thus, executive share ownership and share option payments hold asymmetrical risk
properties according to the idiosyncratic response of each executive and the consequent different effects
on corporate resource allocation decisions (Table 5).
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Table 5: Shares and Options
Factors: Shares Share options
Potentially most valuable when
exercised during:
Predictable market Volatile market
Dividend payments Yes No
Expense against profit Yes No
Taxation treatment Double taxation Tax benefit
CEO behaviour Risk avoidance Risk taking, potential abuse
Source: compiled by authors
For example, the Sanders (2001) study of 250 firms from Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) which
examined the effects of ownership and option pay, reveals diametrically opposite effects on firm
acquisition and divestiture propensity. In addition, the study shows that contextual characteristics
moderate the risk-seeking behaviour associated with ownership. Share options may be motivational as
they offer upside potential without imposing real downside risk on those who receive them in their
compensation plans (Sanders, 2001). Hence, options lead executives to take risks that shareholders
might otherwise avoid, as executives view the potential future payout associated with option pay as a
form of compensatory lottery (Sanders, 2001). They engage in the acquisition, divestiture and other risk
activities and strategies to increase the probability that the share option compensation ‘lottery’ will pay
off.
Additional to risk taking incentives is that the structure of the Anglo-American model of corporate
governance favours hostile take-overs, thus threatening executive management’s jobs as well as the jobs
of employees. The impact of this model of efficiency achievement coupled with the drive to increase
shareholder value acts to the detriment of employees, even if they manage to keep their jobs. The
affected employees may perceive the prospect of acquisition and mergers, or even outsourcing, as being
contemporary ‘serfdom’; being sold-off, often with capital equipment, in a manner similar to land in
Imperial Russia being sold-off with its ‘serfs’ (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001). With ‘new ownership’
and ‘new management’, employees often feel that they have been betrayed to the principle of economic
efficiency. Additionally, over time, executives can gain additional power by controlling the information
revealed to other stakeholders (Walsh and Seward, 1990). For example, the close relationship between
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warranted value and market value tests the ability of investors to ferret out appropriate information and
process it quickly to arrive at pricing decisions (McTaggart et al, 1994). Thus, information concerning
the financial health of the organisation can be manipulated affecting the warranted value of a company’s
shares. Where the CEO is the founder or occupies the dual role of CEO and president, the strategic
planning and resource allocation processes (key institutional value drivers) may be unduly over
influenced by that single executive (Bebchuk et al, 2002; Compb and Skill, 2003). With the increase of
CEO influence emerges the propensity for excessive pay rises irrespective of stock performance
(Bebchuk et al, 2002; Compb and Skill, 2003). The Compb and Skill (2003) study indicates that
shareholders bear the cost of excessive pay when an executive has notable power. Such was the case with
Tyco’s CEO and CFO who, in 2002, earned US$136 million and US$82 million respectively whilst the
company’s stock slid by 71%. However, Tyco is only one example of many (Table 6).
Table 6: CEOs Compensation and Shareholders Return
Company Total CEO Compensation (2002)
millions
Shareholder Return (2002)
Apple Computers US$78.2 -34.6%
Lucent Technology US$38.2 (base salary) Plus package -75.4%
Sun Microsystem US$31.7 -74.7%
Tenet Health Care US$35.0 -58.1%
John Hancock Financial
Services
US$34.3 -31.7%
Source: Burke and Schollser (2003)
It is interesting that at the time of emergent market decline, the 52 CEOs who laid off 1,000 workers
or more took, on average, US$23.7 million, a full 80% more than the average CEO in the top 365 group
(Longworth, 2001). Amongst these were Disney’s CEO, Michael Eisner, who earned US$72.8 million in
2000 whilst laying off 4,000 workers, American Express’s Harvey Golub, whose pay rose by 22% while
he laid off 6,600 workers and Cisco Systems’ CEO, John Chambers, who made US$28.7 million, in
2000, including a 40% pay increase, while laying off 8,5000 workers (IPS/UFFE, 2001; Longworth,
2001).
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Table 7: Fortune 500 Companies
Fortune 500 Year 2000 Year 2001 Year 2002
Total Revenue 7.2 trillion 7.4 trillion 7 trillion
Total Profit 443.9 billion 206.2 billion 69.9 billion
Total Reported Loss 18.1 billion 148.5 billion 295.7 billion
Companies reported losses 53 97 120
Source: Compiled from Fortune (2003)
In contrast, at the height of the bear market, (Table 7) the median top executive pay rose by 32% for
chairmen and CEOs, 10% for senior financial analysts and 6% for CFOs (Useem et al, 2003). In contrast,
some of the more spectacular pay rises have occurred in the defence industry. The median CEO pay for
the 37 largest defence contractors including Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman,
and General Dynamics, rose by 79% (Fig. 1; IPS/UFFE, 2003). Median top executive pay was 45%
higher in 2002 at defence contractor enterprises than at the 365 large companies surveyed by Business
Week Magazine (IPS/UFFE, 2003). The jump of USA defence contractors CEO pay far exceeded the
increase in defence expenditure, which rose 14% from 2001 to 2002 (IPS/UFFE, 2003).
Figure 1: Median CEO of USA’s CEOs 2000-2002
$6m
$5m
$4m
$3m
$2m
$1m
Defence contracter ten CEOs
All CEOs
2000 2001 2002
$5.4
$3.7
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Source: Adopted from IPS/UFFE (2003)
The study also reveals that the size of political campaign contributions by the largest defence
contractors is strongly correlated with the value of defence contracts awarded to that company
(IPS/UFFE, 2003). The study indicates that 90% of the difference in contract size can be explained by
size of contribution (IPS/UFFE, 2003). However, the entanglement of business and politics is not new.
Intermingling was first revealed with the South Sea bubble collapse in August-September 1720, when a
parliamentary inquiry found that the company books were largely fictitious and that many MPs and
government officials had accepted bribes from the company’s directors (Paterson et al, 2003).
Regulatory Response
In response to the South Sea scandal when company shares fell 84% from their peak, government
enhanced the power of the newly formed Bank of England, which changed the running of the country’s
finances (Paterson et al, 2003). In the USA, comparable state intervention has been pursued by both the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Justice Department. On the issue of mergers, a more laissez-
faire position has been adopted as was the case with Microsoft (Becker, 2001). However, even when
regulations are introduced, executives find ways to circumvent them (Table 8). For example, in 1993,
after considerable scrutiny of CEO pay, Congress changed the tax codes so that companies could not
deduct executive salaries from their tax bill if they exceeded US$1 million. This regulation did not
reduce the growth of CEO pay but altered the structure of pay. Instead of high salaries, highly paid
executives received increased grants of stock options. Because of accounting rules and practices these
options never reduced reported profit but instead reduced taxes when the options were exercised (Table
9). For example, Cisco had received tax breaks sometimes exceeding its reported net income, whilst
Microsoft received a US$2.1 billion tax break as a result of exercised options (Henry et al, 2002).
16
Table 8: Regulations and Results
Initiative Regulation initiated by
Congress
Results
1989 Cap on ‘golden
parachute’
Excess tax on payments above
2.99 times of base salary
2.99 is the new minimum
and company covers any
excess tax for executives
1992 Disclosure of directors
pay
Better disclosure of CEOs pay Social comparison approach
–how much other CEOs
receive then try to get more
1993 Cap on tax rebate on
executive pay
Salary over US$1 million to be
non-tax-exempt
Huge stock option grants and
upping of most salaries to £1
million.
Source: compiled from Useem et al, (2003)
Table 9: Tax Avoidance
Corporation Pre-tax profit millions -
1996-2000*
Federal income tax
million- 1996-2000**
Enron 1785 -381 (rebate)
Colgate-Palmolive 1637 -21 (rebate)
Navistar 1368 28 (payed)
* Pre-tax USA profit is based on net domestic income. Adjustments have
been made for items such as ‘acquired in process research’ and goodwill
write-off in excess of the amount claimed for tax purpose.
** Tax is currently tax paid, excluding deferrals on stock options
Source: Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, Citizen for Tax Justice (2003)
In 2001, approximately 58% of CEO pay of the larger American companies was provided for in share
options (The Economist, 2002). However, options costs were typically not included in profit calculation
when reporting to shareholders but included in preparation for tax. Although share-options are not the
solo culprit of business scandals, their high profile has attracted government attention. In response to
Enron, Global Crossing, World Com, Tyco, and other accounting scandals, the USA government has
initiated a number of changes in accounting and taxation rules. In future, companies have to exercise
options as a cost (i.e. outstanding shares) at the time they are granted. As the challenge of valuing options
remains arbitrary, for example, through using any of three available Black-Scholes methods for options
pricing, different results may emerge.
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Stakeholder Influence
The stakeholder perspective to corporate inter and intra-relations is concerned with the process of
social engagement. The corporate relationship with society has a long history. For example, in the
Middle Ages, ‘God’ was considered a stakeholder or a corporate partner whose profits could be
distributed to the poor by the end of each year (Eberstadt, 1977). Even Smith’s (1937) identification of
external interests to the firm may be viewed as an early recognition of stakeholders. Barnard (1938)
suggested that employees are an important factor in a firm’s success and their interests need to be
carefully assessed. Abrams (1951) identified four corporate claimants on the corporation - employees,
stockholders, customers and the public, including government. It was Freeman (1984) who propounded
Stakeholder Theory emphasising the role and influence of an array of actors on the firm. Freeman (1984:
46) defined a stakeholder as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of
an organisation’s objectives’, emphasising that organisations need to identify their direct and indirect
stakeholders as well as their interests. Freeman (1984) defines the ‘stake’ that stakeholders have in the
corporation as equity, economic or influence based and the power that they wield is exercised through
voting. Irrespective of whether economic power or political power is adopted, influential stakeholders
promote the notion of corporate obligation towards external social actors. Freeman (1984: 83) also
suggested that firms need to know ‘what they stand for’, through a value analysis process, in order to
look for congruency with stakeholders.
To date the adoption of stakeholder considerations in determining directors pay is limited to
economic considerations within the bounds of stakeholder models of governance, (Kakabadse and
Kakabadse, 2001; Kakabadse et al, 2001). However, within a globalising economic reality, stakeholder
theory needs to be canvassed from a broader socio-political context in order to be sensitive to global
stakeholders (Bebchuk et al, 2002). Social contract thinking that builds on legal concepts of reciprocal
rights and duties between parties is necessary, but not sufficient. What is required is consideration of a
much broader set of relationships than the ones between an organisation and society (Donaldson and
Dunfee, 1994). Social contracts should also include the relationship between organisations and other
societies and between societies. The emerging expectation for social responsibility through social
reporting is an effort to aggregate various stakeholder information requirements and expectations. Social
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reporting has its roots in the early 1940s. Interest was renewed in the 1970s as environmental
accountability and, again, as social auditing in the 1990s, exemplified by certain Scandinavian and
continental European firms moving towards more comprehensive corporate reporting thus culminating in
the present day corporate social responsibility movement (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2003).
Wood (1991: 693) defines corporate social responsibility as a ‘business organisation’s configuration
of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness and policies, programs and
observable outcomes as they relate to the firm’s social relationships’. In his view, corporate social
responsibility starts with top management awareness of the need for corporate responsibility to
stakeholder issues, which, in turn, leads to policy commitment and, ideally, ends with implementation at
the operational level. Towards this end the Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT) (Donaldson and
Dunfee, 1994) provides for an understanding of stakeholder contracts at a macro-level. ISCT builds a
bridge across a broad range of concepts of contract including the ‘social contract’ and business ethics. It
explains that a social contract is one that builds on the legal concept of reciprocal rights and duties
between parties but encompasses a much broader relationship between an organisation and society and
how duties and rights involved in a social contract may be guided by both legal standards, such as
corporate law and agency regulation, as well as by social norms about what duties are and should be
owed by the parties involved to each other (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994). Many economies are
introducing legislation, which, in varying degrees, allows corporate boards to consider duties to
stakeholders other than stockholders in the making of corporate decisions (Preston and Sapienza, 1990;
Polonsky and Ryan, 1996). Thus, irrespective of the more cynical view that visible social involvement is
simply a means of insuring business legitimacy (Preston and Post, 1975; Davis, 1973; 1975), the
challenge remains of reconciling stakeholder demands, if for no other reason than the advantage to be
gained from visible corporate responsiveness, and the creation of shareholder value, as two critical pillars
that support the deterring of unwelcome stakeholder attention to senior executive remuneration.
Need For a Geo-Political Approach
Relationships between an enterprise and its stakeholders are dynamic, complex, and ever changing
(Ackerman, 1975; Mahon, 1989). Empirical research suggests that awareness of and responsiveness to
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external stakeholders and external issues has positive effects on both corporate social performance and
corporate economic performance (Miles, 1987; Clarkson, 1988; Frooman, 1997). Emerging evidence
suggests that corporations that are pro-active and accommodating in the management of stakeholder
relations perform better in terms of economic performance than those organisations that are reactive and
defensive (Clarkson, 1988; Frooman, 1997).
Such complexity of relationships and interaction falls in the remit of political theories of organisation,
whereby the firm is seen as a political coalition and executives as its primary political brokers (March
and Simon, 1958; March, 1982). According to a political model, firm behaviour responds to the interests
and beliefs of the dominant coalition. However, whilst organisations are ruled by political elites, or
dominant coalitions, these elites do not last due to inter-elite conflicts that provide impetus for change
(Selznick, 1957; Pareto, 1968: 176; Putman, 1976). These dynamics of political coalitions are central to
understanding power in organisations and can help explain, for example, why succession is relatively
independent from firm performance (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). For example, a political model of
corporate governance can be perceived as an approach in which active investors seek to change corporate
policy by developing voting support from dispersed shareholders, rather than by simply purchasing
voting power and control (Pound, 1993). Shareholder activism, environmental lobby groups, changing
economic conditions, changing markets, emergence of employee ownership of stock and the growth of
global corporations all give rise to the geo-political model of corporate governance (Kakabadse et al
2001; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001; 2003).
Changing socio-economic contexts and an increased rise in democratic politics that foster an open,
decentralised process and full debate of alternative ideas will force corporations to maturely evolve in
response to such developments (Pound, 1993). For example, an appreciation and understanding of the
political marketplace is essential for the analysis of the role that the capital market mechanism plays in
corporate governance (Gundfest, 1993; Turnbull, 1997). As Bhide (1994:138) argues, ‘good governance
requires real policy trade-off’. Hence, corporate governance performance issues are related to a broader
political context and, as such, can be understood from the geo-political perspective (Bebchuk, et al,
2002).
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With the emergence of Japan as a world economic power, more than the 90% of all firms listed on
the Japanese stock market in 1988 had a scheme for employee stock option participation (ESOP) (Jones
and Kato, 1993). Of the approximate 7,000 listed companies on the American stock exchange about
1,000 firms are at least 10% employee held (Tseo, 1996) and the trend in Russia, where employee
ownership is higher than in the USA, (Blasi and Gasaway, 1993) raises the need for recognition of all
stakeholders and the need for an extended strategic debate (Denham and Porter, 1995; Monks, 1996;
Turnbull, 1997). However, ESOPs are no panacea. For a considerable number of firms, employee
ownership has had little effect on participation and governance (Pendleton, 2001), and, in fact, in certain
companies has put the investment capital of workers at considerable risk (Blasi, 1988). Employee
participation in governance has had more positive impact through the introduction of employee directors
and employee shareholder communities. The presence of an employee type of director encourages
behaviour that is sensitive to the long term sustainability of the corporation (Covlin, 2003). For example,
General Mills Inc, matches the bonuses awarded to senior executives with its pension contribution on
behalf of its employees according to the year’s performance in order to encourage long term thinking
(Henry et al, 2002).
Whether unionised or not, the right of workers to elect representatives who meet periodically to
review their company’s HR polices, including executive compensation, training and development,
pensions and other benefits, as well as layoff provisions, is advocated by 70% of the surveyed workforce
in USA (Kochan, 2002). The value of making boards accessible to employee representatives is illustrated
by TIAA-CREF practice, the largest educational pension fund covering college professors, whose
example is being adopted by other organisation, such as airline companies (Kochan, 2002).
Broadening Understanding of Remuneration
As relationships between firms and a broader range of stakeholders become more developed and
commonplace, the nature of their communication needs to take the form of a genuine dialogue
(Frederick, 1994). It has to go beyond one-way communication and current measures of non-financial
performance, such as through Balanced Scorecard. Stakeholders will increasingly expect public
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transparency of the business and those who fail to comply with such public expectations will risk public
criticism and loss of reputation (Waddock and Graves, 1997).
In drafting a model of executive remuneration, incorporating broader stakeholder considerations,
attention is given to agency, economic and socio-comparative theories that offer relevant insight as well
as limitations in explaining director remuneration. Critical is the nature and relevance of incentives. The
strength of belief in the efficacy of agency theory thinking, strongly suggests that appropriate incentives
influencing senior managers performance need to be in place in order to induce improved company
performance, (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001). However, in order to account for broader stakeholder
sentiment, these incentives need to be linked to broader socio-political factors that influence the
environment in which the corporation and executives operate. These factors need to be inclusive of
stakeholder relationships and corporate social and environmental responsibility issues. For senior
executives to be more responsive to broader, globally located community issues, is particularly pertinent
currently, as substantial changes are taking place in corporate and taxation rules and regulations as well
as in other areas such as increased shareholder activism and the growing number of stakeholder driven
not-for-profit organisations (NGOs) and campaigning organisations, such as the World Development
Movement (WDM), and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). There is a
growing need for further research to re-examine remuneration package instrument sensitivity to company
performance against corporate social responsibility performance and corporate responsiveness to local
and global communities. Inclusiveness (who is included in democratic dialogue), procedural propriety
(the basis on which the dialogue is designed and implemented), responsiveness (sensitivity of various
parties to dialogue), and outcomes (what happens and who bears the associated costs and benefits) are
key indicators of corporate willingness to support responsible citizenship (Kakabadse and Kakabadse,
2003; Zadek, 2003).
Towards this end, a model of the components of director remuneration, accounting for geo-political
influences, is presented (Fig. 2). The model allows for deliberative democratic processes, where all
stakeholders can be involved in making collectively binding policy decisions. Policy proposals pursued
on the basis of self-interest, are unlikely to survive the scrutiny increasingly gaining momentum in a
globalising world. Encouraged are disclosure, bargaining and negotiation in the context of deliberative
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policy making. In practice, this means that all critical and interested stakeholders should have the same
chance to define issues, dispute evidence and shape the agenda of one’s own work within a context of the
governors accepting to govern and be governed. The need is to move from a corporate control
philosophy, where employees can be treated as ‘serfs’ (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001; Kakabadse et
al; 2001) at the operational level, or as mercenaries owing no loyalty except to themselves and thus going
to the highest bidder in the case of directors, to a philosophy of corporate citizenship, which, in turn,
encourages development of a heightened awareness of the impact of business on society (Logan, 2000;
Zadek, 2003). The irony is, that through inducing greater stakeholder awareness, the philosophy and
practice of shareholder value may be more effectively promoted. Through providing greater customer
value through human resource strategies that encourage higher levels of commitment, a positive
stakeholder environment is generated in the firm, thus realising higher levels of shareholder value
(McTaggart et al, 1994). Yet, there is still some way to go as, even today, with an ever growing
stakeholder awareness and greater legal safeguards, one in twenty workers in USA companies who vote
for the union can expect to be fired (Kochan, 2002). Terminology such as ‘human resources’, ‘human
capital’, ‘talent’ or ‘employees’ implies ownership of people by other people. ‘Corporate citizen’ implies
membership, loyalty and interdependency. The migration to a community philosophy to review corporate
governance issues requires a re-definition of the role of the shareholder and the introduction of ideas of
corporate constitutions and corporate citizenship. It is likely that the encouragement of citizenship will
also ‘bolster’ current stakeholder remuneration practice, particularly concerning employee share option
participation (ESOP) as a means to encourage active employee involvement in the affairs of the
corporation, or more broadly, the environment (McTaggart et al, 1994).
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Figure 2: Geo-Politics of Director’s Remuneration
Source: compiled by authors
Considering that of the world’s 100 largest economies, 50 are corporations (Handy, 1997) and that
transnational corporations and large, nationally-based enterprises are rapidly filling the political vacuum
previously occupied by nation states, the need for a geo-political perspective to better understanding all
aspects of governance in corporations, including director remuneration, is increasingly pressing. Dealing
with corporations as political institutions implies the need to apply the same rules as for a nation-state -
democratic rights. Matters of human rights, free speech, the right to be informed, to a share of the
proceeds of one’s own work and that governors be socially and economically governed, are emerging
corporate issues. The need for greater disclosure with regard to potential conflicts of interests, regarding
corporate activities, client relationships, and other market sensitive news, as well as improvement in the
quality, accuracy and relevance of financial information, are issues of equal critical importance.
Enterprise has, after all, historically always been about a community of people.
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